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This paper investigates the intrahousehold resource allocation on children’s education 
and its earnings consequence in Chinese labour market. In order to overcome the 
endogeneity problem of schooling, we consider the siblings structure and the available 
public facilities as instrumental variables. Females’ education is negatively affected 
by siblings (brothers or sisters) number, while males’ education is also negatively 
affected by their brothers but much less by their sisters. For the youngest cohort born 
after 1980, the education of a girl would be heavily impeded by her sisters, reflecting 
strong distortion of “One-Child Policy” on intrahousehold resource allocation. 
Comparing the OLS and GIV estimations for returns to schooling, we find that there 
are downwards biases of OLS estimations for males in all cohorts and in all years. 
However, for females, downwards biases of OLS estimation are only for data before 
2004, as females in the old cohorts actually have upwards biases after 2004. 
Education returns of the youngest cohort are much higher than old cohorts supporting 
the argument of heterogeneous human capital accumulation during transition.    
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A number of studies find that returns to education increased from 
the ‘‘pre-transition’’ period to the ‘‘early transition’’ period in transition countries. 
Rutkowski (2001) argues that the increase in the premium to university education has 
been the main observable factor behind the increase in earnings inequality during the 
transition of central European countries. However, Flabbi et al. (2008) find that the 
rising trend in returns to education over the transition period is actually quite weak in 
eight transition economies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, 
Russia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia), even though there are significant differences 
in returns across transition countries. Thus, the features of the changes of education 
returns over the transition period still remain vague.  
As the largest transition economy in the world, policy makers, academics and the 
public in China have shown long interest in the changing nature of education returns. 
As Zhang et al. (2005) point out, education returns provide information about the 
incentives for human capital accumulation, the efficiency of resource allocation, and 
the distributional consequences of differences in human capital. Chinese labour 
market liberalization, more flexible wage setting and the broader transition to a 
market economy since the 1980s are assumed to lead to an increase in education 
returns which has far-reaching social, political, and economic gender-differentiated 
implication (Berik et al., 2007). However, some factors may offset the expected 
increases of education returns. For example, skills and experience acquired under 
central planning may be less useful in the new market environment. The pace of 
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privatization, enterprises restructuring and changes in labour force participation of 
married women may also either exacerbate or offset gender-differentiated rising 
education returns (Kang and Peng, 2013). In a society where the state has a historic 
commitment to promoting gender equality (Gal and Kligman, 2000), a study of 
education returns in China based on a wide view of gender, family and society is 
highly demanded.  
Before the economic reforms in 1978, China had virtually no labour market, and 
nearly all firms were state-owned enterprises or de facto state-owned enterprises. 
Wages of all workers were determined and controlled through a rigid system to reduce 
labour costs for rapid industrialization. Low wages were made possible by state 
provision of public facilities and services to workers and their families (Peng, 1992; 
Nee, 1996). This heavy planning led to poor effort incentives which depressed 
productivity and innovation and made the family income much dependent on public 
facilities such as energy, water and transportation. There were several wage reform 
waves in the late 1980s and 1990s to create a more market-oriented wage structure. 
The former rigid wage system has been replaced by two components consisting of 
fixed and variable wages.
1
 In 1986, the State Council formally introduced individual 
labour contracts to end the system of permanent employment. Thus, by the early 
2000s, the labour market began to decide wages and employment in China (Meng and 
                                                             
1
 The fixed portion includes the basic wages, seniority wage, insurance (medical, 
unemployment and pensions) and a housing fund. The variable portion includes 
bonuses, based on both individual productivity and enterprise profitability. 
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Kidd, 1997; Freeman, 2007). 
On the other hand, Chinese education institutions have been transitioning from a 
highly regulated and rigid system to a market-based and flexible system. In 1986, 
China announced a compulsory education policy in 1986 and gradually enforced this 
policy to both urban and rural areas of China in later years. At the same time, China 
reformed the financial system of higher education,
2
 stating that excellent students can 
apply for scholarships, and students with financial difficulties could receive necessary 
grants which includes living stipends, government-subsidized student loans, 
work-study scholarships, grants and tuition waivers (Li, 2007). From 1999, the state 
launched a large-scale expansion of the higher education sector. In 1998 new 
enrolments in higher education were 1.08 million, but by 2006, this number had 
increased to 4.75 million (Qian and Smyth, 2011). Thereafter, the intrahousehold 
decisions on education investment have been affected by these institutional changes, 
which provide a rare chance of natural experiment to assess the effects of labour 
market and education policy on the gender-differentiated education returns in China, 
concerning the bargaining and competition intrahousehold. 
In this paper, we investigate the returns to schooling in China over the period of 
1989-2009 using the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) dataset. We address 
                                                             
2
 On May 27, 1985, the policy document entitled “Decision of the CPC Central 
Committee Concerning the Reform of the Educational System” began to allow higher 
education institutions to “enroll a limited number of self-financed students beyond the 
national enrolment plan”. 
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the question: as China has transformed from a central planned economy to market 
allocation of resources, do the private returns to education as wage differentials reflect 
the gender-differentiated productivity associated with education or 
gender-differentiated education chances based on intrahousehold resources allocation? 
In China, there is a long-standing social norm that a son is generally preferred than a 
daughter (Lee and Wang, 1999). Only sons could carry the family name and inherit 
the family patrimony (Bernhardt, 1995). The “One-Child Policy” in China enforced 
after 1980 forbid a couple to have more than one child while there are some opt-out 
articles for ethnical minority and people in the rural area (Cameron et al. 2011), 
making the gender of these children more important (Edlund et al., 2007; Qian, 2008). 
As the cohort born after 1980 gradually becomes an important part, and then will be 
the majority of the largest labour force in the world, understanding on the effects of 
policies of labour market, education and population on their lives has become an 
urgent job for labour scholarship in China. Study on education return in this paper 
would shed some new light on this issue.   
This paper adopts the ordinary least square (OLS) and generalized instrumental 
variable (GIV) methodology concerning the intrahousehold decision on education 
investment. In order to overcome the endogeneity problem of schooling, we consider 
the siblings structure and the public facilities as instrumental variables, and assess 
whether the OLS estimates (assuming schooling an exogenous variable) significantly 
differ from the GIV estimates that consider this bias. Therefore, this paper contributes 
to the published literature by investigating the gender-differentiated education returns 
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over the early and later transition periods in China and speculating on the likely 
institutional and structural factors underpinning these results. The study is the first 
empirical analysis of its kind for China and provides valuable new insight into the 
gender-differentiated education returns concerning the policy effects on 
intrahousehold education decision. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In 
section II, we present the OLS and GIV empirical specifications and potential 
instruments for endogeneity of schooling. Data descriptive statistics and estimates of 
the returns to schooling are presented in Section III and IV. Section V concludes. 
 
II.  Empirical Methodology 
Many researchers apply the OLS methodology to examine the 
rates of returns to education in China. Following this tradition, we first estimate the 
returns to education based on the Mincerian earning equation commonly applied in 
the literature (Harmon et al., 2001; Card, 1999; Harmon et al., 2004) as follows: 
iiii XEW   210ln    )1(
                        
 
where lnWi is the log form hourly wage rate of individual i, Ei represent education 
attainment, Xi is a vector of control variables including gender, experience and its 
square, location (urban and province dummies) ; εi is an error term with ε ~N (0, σ
2
). 
Many authors have addressed the endogenous nature of schooling may bias OLS 
estimates of returns to schooling (Dearden, 1999; Card, 1999; Blundell et al., 2005). 
In our CHNS sample, endogeneity can arise because of omitted information of 
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workers’ inner ability. That is, the coefficient of returns to schooling 1 is upwards 
biased because the chosen schooling levels are positively correlated with omitted 
ability variable, while ability is positively correlated with the wage rate (Chen and 
Hamori, 2009). However, Card (1999) argues that OLS estimates of 1 are biased 
downwards because individuals with high discount rates choose low levels of 
schooling, that is, schooling with higher marginal rates of return. In addition, Li and 
Luo (2004) argue that OLS estimators will be biased downwards caused by 
measurement error in schooling variable. They estimate returns to education for 
young workers in urban China and find the OLS estimator are biased downwards by 
7-8 percent per year of schooling.  
Heckman and Li (2004) recommend using the Instrumental Variable (IV) 
methodology to cope with the endogeneity problem in China. They use parental 
education and year of birth as instrumental variables to identify the returns to higher 
education for young people in the urban areas of the six provinces in 2000. The IV 
estimator of average return to four-year college attendance is 43% (on average, 11% 
annually). Moreover, Fleisher and Wang (2005) use birth year, location dummies of 
elementary education (rural/small town, medium city, or large city), and their 
interaction as IVs of endogenous schooling and find IV estimated education returns 
for an additional year of schooling is 10 percent in every year in 1984, 1987 and 1990. 
Chen and Hamori (2009) use spouse education as instrument and examine education 
returns in urban China using the pooled CHNS 2004 and 2006 data. Even with these 
trials, validity of instruments for schooling is still a big problem in studies of 
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education returns and not satisfactory at either theoretical or statistic sense. To be a 
valid instrumental variable for the endogenous years of schooling, the potential 
exogenous instruments should be only theoretically and statistically correlated with 
years of schooling, and not correlated with the unobserved errors in the wage equation 
εi, such as the unobservable inner ability. Belley and Lochner (2007) argue that family 
background (such as parental income) is correlated with children’s cognitive skill and 
hence is not a valid instrumental variable for children’s education. Thus, Heckman 
and Li (2004) also agree their instrumental variable (parental income) should be put 
into the wage equation directly as the proxy of ability rather than used as an 
instrument.  
Moreover, parental income is correlated with parental education, so parental 
education would not be a valid instrument too. Following the same line of reasoning, 
although birth year used in Fleisher and Wang (2005) may reflect the cohort effect on 
education, it is possible that the cohort effect is correlated with wage through different 
channel such as experience variables in the Mincerian equation. Economists have long 
recognized that people tend to mate with those who have similar individual 
endowments, such as education and other labor market characteristics (Becker and 
Lewis, 1973), and China is no exception. Hence, spouse education in Chen and 
Hamori (2009) is also highly correlated with his/her family background which is 
generally similar to each other and not really exogenous. 
Therefore, this paper tries three potential instrumental variables: number of 
brothers, number of sisters and access to tap water for education return studies in 
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China. First, there is an extensive theoretical literature that postulates a trade-off 
between child quantity and quality within a family, introduced by Becker (1960) and 
expanded in Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976). More recent 
literature find that children from larger families have lower average education levels. 
Black et al. (2005) use a rich dataset on the entire population of Norway and find a 
negative correlation between family size and children’s education. Silles (2010) finds 
that sibling size has an adverse causal effect on test scores and behavioural 
development. Li (2007) finds that student who is the single child or has only one 
sibling in the family is more likely to be enrolled in elite universities in China. Thus, 
family environment especially sibling size plays a prominent role in shaping the 
educational expectations of children. 
Second, the effect of siblings on education returns is different for males and 
females, since children’s educational attainment is the result of family decision 
making, in which the household balances efficiency and equity issues to determine the 
optimal distribution of educational resources (Becker, 1991). Researchers find 
patterns of discrimination in favor of boys in the allocation of household resources, 
including nutrients, health care, and education (Behrman, 1988; Deaton, 1989) . 
Parish and Wills (1992) verify that a brother reduces siblings’ education in Taiwan. 
Butcher and Case (1994) examine the effect of the number and sex composition of a 
boy or girl’s siblings on that children’s educational attainment. They find that in the 
United States between 1920 and 1965, women’s educational choices have been 
systematically affected by the sex composition of her siblings, and that men’s choices 
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have not. Hence, a child’s education may be affected by the size and sex composition 
of siblings if the family faces loaning constraints, especially in the developing 
countries such as China.  
Sons and daughters have different earnings potentials during the period in which 
they contribute to household income. Women historically spent less time in the labour 
force than men and for this reason the returns to education investment may have been 
lower for daughters than for sons. If sons receive a higher return to each level of 
schooling, we should expect to see not only sons receive more education, but also that 
the presence of sons reduces the educational attainment of daughters. Therefore, a girl 
with only sisters would receive more education than a girl with brothers, under the 
assumption of loaning constraints and not upon the exact shape of the parents’ utility 
function (Butcher and Case, 1994). We will check this point in Chinese families. 
Third, we follow literature and argue that education is a kind of public good 
affected by local investment on public facilities. Berik et al. (2007) also point out that 
privatization of healthcare and education disproportionately impedes women’s and 
girls’ access to these services. Women’s increased care burden causes them to seek 
their children’s help in household tasks, often cutting short their daughters’ education. 
Even though good education facilities are located in large urban areas and provincial 
capitals, their locations are determined by historical factors, geographic characteristics, 
fiscal policy, political considerations, defense goals, and the like (Fleisher et al. 
(2010). Pal (2010) verifies that access to public infrastructure plays a crucial role on 
the presence of private schools in a community in India. He highlights the role of 
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village-level public infrastructure (as reflected in the access to concrete road, 
electricity, piped water, phone and post office). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
public facilities tend to generate exogenous impacts on people’s earnings through 
education rather than that their locations have been the result of earnings of people 
who live there.  
Maimaiti and Siebert (2009) investigate girls' school dropout rates in rural China 
and argue that a girl's education suffers when her larger water need for female hygiene 
purposes after menarche is not met because her household has poor access to water. 
Using the same data source as our paper, they find that menarche is associated with an 
increase in the school dropout rate, and indeed the effect is weaker for girls who have 
good access to water. Hence, they conclude that water engineering can thus contribute 
significantly to reducing gender education gaps in rural areas.  
However, Oster and Thornton (2011) address sanitary product provision and 
argue that differences in dropout rate by girls with and without their period (or 
between girls and boys) in China cannot be explained by access to water without good 
attendance data as in Maimaiti and Siebert (2009), which is difficult to rule out 
omitted variable stories. In other words, access to tap water could be a proxy of public 
facility investment by local government which affects education of both males and 
females (but may affect girls more than boys as we see below), and possibly irrelevant 
to girls’ period. Thus, we only use access to tap water as a potential instrumental 
variable for education of both males and females, rather than an explanatory factor for 
gender education gap. 
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Last but not least, because we have employees from many different cohorts, 
individuals are in different sets of years and ages. The aggregated estimates of 
regressions may be mix-ups of many heterogeneous cohorts hence suffer serious 
composition biases (Solon et al., 1994). Therefore, to maximize efficiency, we need 
control for cohort effects. We estimate the regressions by separated gender and age 
cohorts to gain more understanding on patterns of education returns in China. The 
three age cohorts are people born before 1962, during 1962-1980 and born after 1980. 
The cut-off time choice of cohorts is based on the widely accepted structural break 
points in Chinese modern history to allow heterogeneous human capital accumulation 
in our study. The first structural break point is the Chinese famine during 1959-1961 
resulted in the premature death of 30 million people (Lin 1990). Second, 1980 is 
considered a watershed year because of “One-Child Policy” and “reform and 
open-door” policy enacted at the end of the 1970s  (Kang and Peng, 2013). Hence, 
the first age cohort includes people born before 1962; the second age cohort covers 
the largest baby boom periods (1962-1980); the youngest cohort includes people born 
after 1980, that is, the “One-Child Policy” cohort.  
Overall, we adopt an IV approach and using the “numbers of brothers”, “numbers 
of sisters” and “access to piped / tap water in house or courtyard” variables as 
instruments. The following two-step model describes the natural logarithm of hourly 
wage and years of schooling are normally applied to cope with the endogeneity of 
schooling: 
iiii YSXW  
'ln    )2(  
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where Zi denotes the vector of observed instrumental variables for years of schooling
iYS . Number of brothers (Broi) , number of sisters (Sisi), access to tap water (Wateri), 
and the other exogenous variables such as experience and location dummies are in the 
vector Xi, same as in the OLS regression. We estimate this model by gender and age 
cohorts. Thus, our examination of the gendered education returns associated with 
China’s reforms begins with an overview of insights from structural adjustment 
programs since the end of 1980s and the economic reforms in transition economies in 
the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
III. Data 
The dataset used in this paper is the eight waves of the China 
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 
2009). The survey employs a multistage random-cluster sampling process to draw 
households from nine administrative divisions (Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shandong) which include the developed 
coast and the inland. Four counties and 167 communities are randomly selected in 
each province. There are about 4,400 households with a total of 16,000 individuals in 
each survey (Liu et al. 2010, Li and Wu 2011). We use all eight waves to compare 
returns to education over time. The eight sample years represent distinct phases of 
economic reform and business cycle in China. Specifically, the year 1989, 1991 and 
1993 represent the early stage of reform and transition, during which the Chinese 
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leadership still sought reform within the socialist system and ‘‘a reform with no 
losers’’ (Lau et al., 2001); the year 1997, 2000 and 2004 represent the reloaded 
reform after Deng Xiaoping’s South China Tour in 1992, as the central government 
formally endorsed the full-fledged march towards market-orientated economy and 
accelerated steps toward integration with the global economy (Berik et al., 2007); 
2006 and 2009 reflect the boom and bust during the most recent financial crisis.  
Our sample only includes employees (for males aged 16-60 and females aged 
16-52)
3
 with positive annual gross income, working in sectors excluding “Agriculture, 
forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and water conservancy”. Self-employed and 
owners of private or individual enterprises have been excluded, because it is difficult 
to separate their wages from the profit income. Observations with missing values on 
years of schooling and experience have been dropped. Nominal hourly wage is the 
nominal annual earnings (include regular wages, bonuses, all kinds of subsidies and 
in-kind wages from the work unit) divided by annual working hours. We deflate 
nominal hourly earnings into real hourly earnings using provincial urban/rural 
Consumer Price Index based on 1995, provided by the National Bureau of Statistics.  
In the CHNS dataset, the numbers of siblings are only surveyed on ever-married 
women under age 53 and their husbands in 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009. Because the 
CHNS 1989-2009 are actually panel data, we can assume the sibling numbers are 
                                                             
3
 In China, the regulated retirement age is 60 for males and 55 for females. The 
CHNS dataset provides the sibling information only for ever-married females under 
age 53, so we use the cut-off age of 53 for our female sample. 
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invariant over time for all adult respondents and trace back their information of 




Table 1 shows the data description of the main variables over the period 
1989-2009 by gender. Given the typically long working hours, the real hourly wage 
rates of both males and females were very low in China before 1997 (< 2 Yuan per 
hour), which jumped to about 3-4 Yuan per hour in 1997, and then have been rising to 
10.19 Yuan for males and 7.49 Yuan for females in 2009. With respect to gender 
earnings differentials, males’ wages have grown faster than females’ over last two 
decades. The earnings ratio of women to men decreased mildly, from 0.83 in 1989 to 
0.74 in 2009, which is consistent with Gustafsson and Li’s (2000) findings. 
The average years of schooling have increased from 8.39 years to 10.49 years 
over the entire period for males. The average years of schooling of females was 7.82 
years in 1989, being less than males’, but they caught up with males very quickly and 
surpassed them in recent years. The average numbers of brothers or sisters were less 
than two, suggesting that one family has 4 or 5 children which were declining slightly 
over time as the “One-Child Policy” was enacted after 1980. The percentages of 
                                                             
4
 For those missing values, we impute their sibling numbers using prediction function 
as follows: Sibi = f (Bi, Pri, Urbani, Malei), where Sibi is the number of brothers (Broi) 
or number of sisters (Sisi), Bi is the birth year, Pri is the vector of province dummies; 




households which had access to piped/tap water in house or courtyard had been 
increasing from about 70 percent in 1989 to about 90 percent in 2009. The average 
experience of male employees was around 21 years before 2004 and more than 24 
years after then, partly reflecting the population ageing resulting from the “One-Child 
Policy”. Female employees had less experience because they retired earlier than males. 
Moreover, less than half of the employee sample was from urban area. The oldest male 
cohort (born before 1962) decreased from 62 percent to 32 percent of our employee 
sample due to retirement, and the baby boom cohort after Chinese famine (born during 
1962-1980) was above 50 percent after 1997. The “One-Child Policy” cohort (after 
1980) entered the labour market in 2000, and comprised 14 percent of full sample in 
2009. Female cohorts have very similar pattern to male cohorts.  
 
(Table 1 is around here) 
 
Table 2 describes the variables by gender and age cohorts in the pooled dataset of 
all eight waves. As expected, the youngest cohort has the highest real hourly wage 
rates of 6.8 Yuan per hour for males and 5.92 Yuan per hour for females. They also 
have the longest years of schooling of 10.59 years for males and 11.19 years for 
females, as well as much shorter experience. And, they have much less brothers and 
sisters than older cohorts for both genders which is consistent with the enforcement of 
“One- Child Policy” after 1980.  
Although the “One-Child Policy” was meant to cover the country as a whole, 
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people in rural areas have always allowed a second child if the first birth is a girl. In 
some rural areas and over some periods even three children were allowed. In addition, 
ethnical minority people who are subject to much looser restrictions have more 
opt-out from the policy (Peng, 1991, Cameron 2011). In the urban areas, however, the 
policy has been strictly enforced since it was introduced. Those who obey the policy 
are financially rewarded while those who violate the policy are subject to fines and 
their children face higher fees for accessing education and health services. In some 
cases, children are denied these services (Kane an Choi, 1999; Zhang and Sturm, 
1994). Hence, once a family had a boy, most parents would stop seeking legal or 
illegal way to have another child because either way is costly.  
 
(Table 2 is around here) 
 
Under the restriction of policy, Chinese parents would like to seek a way to have 
another child if they had the first birth of girl. Once they had a boy, they would stop 
because of high cost of fine. Hence, parental sex selection on children may distort the 
sex composition of siblings. It is not surprising that in the “One-Child Policy” cohort, 
males have fewer brothers (0.43) than sisters (0.81), while females have more 
brothers (0.82) than sisters (0.64). It is a prominent policy distortion of sex 
composition of siblings, compared with older cohorts who have broadly similar 
brother and sister numbers for both males and females (around 2 for the cohort born 
before 1962, around 1.6 for the cohort born 1962-1980). It can also explain the less 
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proportions of urban residence in younger cohorts as people in rural areas have 
opt-out from the policy. Thus, gender and age cohorts show much heterogeneous 
characteristics of variables in our sample, supporting estimation by gender and age 
cohorts.  
IV. Empirical Results 
A lot of literature warn about the endogeneity problem of years of 
schooling and suggest the instrumental variables for unbiased estimations. We apply a 
2 Stage Least Square (2SLS) procedure for estimation. In the first step, we regress 
years of schooling on instruments and get the 1SLS estimator by cohort using 
equation (3). Then we calculate the predicted values of years of schooling for each 
cohort. Hence, the variable of years of schooling can be decomposed into two 
components: a linear combination of instruments (predicted years of schooling) and a 
random component. In the second step, we estimate equation (2) using the predicted 
years of schooling. And, we apply this GIV method for estimation year by year and 





A. First step of GIV 
Results of the first step of GIV by gender and age cohorts are reported in Table 3. 
                                                             
5
 See Card (2001)for a theoretical treatment of the interpretation of instrumented 
variables and the practical application in STATA (Baum et al., 2003).  
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Estimation would perform poorly when instruments were weak, so we need test the 
validity of the instruments (number of brothers, number of sisters, and access to tap 
water). We report the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics (Cragg and Donald, 1993),   
critical values of which have been compiled by Stock and Yogo (2002). We use these 
critical values to judge the validity of instruments, and find that linear combination of 
instruments fit years of schooling very well except the male cohort born after 1980.  
 
(Table 3 is around here) 
 
Moreover, we stack the cohort-specific regressions using the Chi2 statistics in the 
Seemingly Unrelated Estimation (SUEST) (Weesie, 1999) to test whether coefficients 
of these IVs significantly different from zero. The Chi-2 statistics are 308.14 for the 
combined two regressions of the full samples of males and females; 274.4 for the 
combined regressions of three male age cohorts; and 240.39 for the combination of 
regressions of three female age cohorts. The Chi2 tests easily reject the hypothesis that 
the three IVs are not significantly associated with years of schooling. Hence, we regard 
three IVs as valid instrumental variables for years of schooling.  
In Table 3, with constraint of economic resources for education investment, 
parents need allocate intrahousehold resource on children’s education. We find that 
the more does the respondent have siblings the less are his/her years of schooling. For 
the full sample of males, one more brother would decrease a boy’s schooling by about 
0.16 year. In the similar way, one more sibling (brother or sister) would decrease a 
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girl’s schooling by about 0.17 year for the full sample of females. However, boys’ 
education is much less affected by their sisters, as one more sister would decrease a 
boy’s schooling only by about 0.06 year. It reflects the long tradition of parental 
preference for sons and less education investment on daughters in China.
 
In a 
patrilineal and patrilocal society like China, sons and their wives are expected to live 
with sons’ parents; daughters are married out and become part of another family; 
children are named with their father’s last name, not the mother’s. Therefore, only 
sons who can guarantee the provision of financial support and care for the old parents 
could inherit the family name and carry on the family line (Li and Wu, 2011).
6
 In 
                                                             
6
 The parental son preference in China could be traced back to the origins of ancestral 
worship in the second and third millennia B.C. The patrilocal and patrilineal familial 
system developed during imperial state reinforced this preference(Lee and Wang, 
1999) (Bray, 1997) Li and Wu 2011 . In one of the oldest poems in China, sons and 
daughters were treated in different ways in family (sleeping places, clothes and toys 
for education): 
Sons shall be born to him : --  
They will be put to sleep on couches ; 
They will be clothed in robes ; 
They will have sceptres to play with ;…… 
Daughters shall be born to him : --  
They will be put to sleep on the ground ; 
They will be clothed with wrappers ; 
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such a society, girls would have been allocated less resource for education than their 
brothers by parents.  
For different age cohorts, we find that the negative effects of siblings are more 
significant in two older age cohorts (born before 1980) than in the youngest 
“One-Child Policy” cohort after 1980. Especially in the cohort born during 1962-1980, 
the resources constraints are more serious after 1959-1961 famine and thereafter baby 
boom, suggesting more careful relocation of intrahousehold resource. The baby boom 
cohort is the current majority of labour force so dominates the significantly negative 
effects of siblings (brothers or sisters) on years of schooling in the full sample. 
Moreover, according to the opt-out articles of the “One-Child Policy”, only 
ethnical minority and people in rural areas with the first birth of a girl are allowed to 
have more than one child. Once a family had a boy, parents would stop seeking legal 
or illegal way to have another child because either way is costly. Hence, the 
preference of first birth of boy is strengthened by the policy and finally affects the 
education investment intrahousehold. In the “One-Child Policy” cohort, it is not 
surprising that education of males is not significantly affected by siblings (brothers or 
sisters). For the females, their education would not be affected by their brothers. It is 
possibly because there are more intrahousehold resources as well as better public 
                                                                                                                                                                              
They will have tiles to play with . 





facilities outside available after economic reforms launched in 1980. The tuition fees 
are removed off for the 9-year compulsory education with the compulsory policy 
launched in 1986. Thus, intrahousehold resource allocation for children’s education is 
much easier after 1980 than before.  
However, the education of a girl would be heavily affected (-0.379) if she had 
another sister, suggesting their parents have no legal chance to have the third child for 
a son. Having no male descendant would bring structural breaks in family decisions 
on consumption, saving and children education investment. Taking into account the 
influence of Chinese traditional cultural norms on women’s marriage and care 
responsibilities, the responsibility of caring old parents is mainly upon their sons and 
daughters-in-law (Liu et al., 2000). The parents without male descendants may expect 
no financial support and care from daughters in their old ages and would not reduce 
their current consumption for daughters’ education investment. In other words, 
parents without son may save more money from reduction of their daughters’ 
education to help their older life in case of no financial support and care from 
daughters.  
At the same time, under the stricter policy, those parents choose to, legally or 
illegally have another child after the first birth of a girl are more likely to prefer sons 
and large family size. They are a selected subgroup of parents of sample in the cohort 
born after 1980. Hence, they are also more disappointed with the second girl and 
relocate less intrahousehold resource on children’s education. Comparing with their 
spouses, women are found to be more likely to spend family resources on nutrition, 
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education, and health-related commodities  (Von Braun, 1988; Thomas, 1990), so 
play an important role on intrahousehold resource allocation on children education 
(especially for daughters). However, Li and Wu (2011) find that the mothers with first 
birth of girl would have less bargaining power on intrahousehold resource allocation 
and have less resource for children’s education. This result is consistent with the view 
of feminist scholars that social and cultural norms are important determinants of 
women’s education. We do not find this kind of distortion in older cohorts, because 
females with sisters do not mean that they have no brother before the “One-Child 
Policy”. Thus, as feminist economists argued, the seemingly gender neutral policies 
implemented through social and cultural norms that bear and transmit gender biases 
can impede gender equity, and that gender inequality, in turn, can hinder the 
attainment of other human development objectives  (Seguino and Grown, 2006; 
Ding et al., 2009). 
Access to tap water improves the years of schooling for the three cohorts and 
both genders, which has significantly positive effects on children’s education 
especially for girls. If a household has access to tap water, implying better public 
facilities provided by local government during the period of children’s education, the 
years of schooling of boys (full sample) would increase by 1.5 years and even more 
for girls by 1.7 year. Hence, education of females is more dependent on outside public 
goods than males. For different age cohorts, we find the effects of access to water are 
less important for younger cohorts than for older cohorts. For example, access to 
water improves years of schooling of males by 1.5 year (females by 1.9 year) in the 
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cohorts born before 1962, compared with by 1.1 year for males (females by 1.5 year) 
for in the cohorts born after 1980. Thus, the external public goods are less important 
for family decision on education over time, as more and more private resources are 
available intrahousehold.  
 
B. OLS vs. second step of GIV 
Table 4 compares OLS and GIV estimation year by year. Panel A shows the basic 
results of OLS estimation using equation (1). In the full sample, females’ returns for 
an additional year of schooling (average 5.4 percent) are higher than males’ (average 
3.7 percent). The earnings returns for an additional year of schooling increase from 
about 2 percent in 1989 for both genders to 7 percent for males and 10.3 percent for 
females in 2009. However, for both males and females, we see a decline of education 
returns after 2004. The big expansion of higher education happened in 1999, as the 
enrolment of higher education has increased 4 times in 7 years (Qian and Smyth 
2011). The decline of education returns after 2004 just reflect the graduates entering 
the labour market. 
  
(Table 4 is around here) 
 
Panel B in Table 4 shows the estimation results of the second step of GIV 
regressions by year and gender using equation (2) and predicted variable of years of 
schooling. The returns to schooling are insignificant for males in 1991, 1993 and 1997 
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and for females in 1993. Before 2004, education returns for females are higher than 
males as we find in OLS results. However, by eliminating the endogeneity problem, 
males’ returns to schooling are higher than their OLS estimators over the entire period.  
Females’ returns to schooling are also higher than their OLS estimators before 2004, 
but lower than their OLS estimators after 2000. Education returns for females are 
lower than males after 2000, which are different from OLS results. Thus, there are 
downwards biases of OLS estimation for males in all years as Card (1999) and Li and 
Luo (2004) argued. For females, however, downwards biases of OLS estimation are 
only for data before 2000. For females after 2000, the OLS estimation has upwards 
biases on education returns as (Chen and Hamori, 2009) argued.  
These results show the necessity of instruments of siblings and tap water, and 
prove the over-optimistic assessment of females’ education returns after 2000 may be 
from the ignorance of negative effects of endogeneity problem. In other words, if 
females with higher ability have more education, OLS results would give 
over-optimistic judgment on females’ education returns. However, we do not know 
what forces are behind the drop of females’ education returns after 2000 and what 
take account for the gap of education returns between males and females. Hence, we 
push the study further by estimating the model by gender and age cohorts.  
Table 5 compares OLS and GIV estimation cohort by cohort. Panel A illustrates 
the interactive variables of year of schooling and year dummies for the pooled data by 
gender and age cohort. For the full sample of both genders, the returns to schooling 
are quite stable around 2 percent for an additional year of schooling during the period 
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of 1989-1997 and then jump to 4.7 (=1.5+3.2) percent for males and 6 (=2.5+3.5) 
percent for females in 2000,
7
 then nearly double in 2004. In 2009, the returns to 
schooling are 7.6 (=1.5+6.1) percent for males and 10.7 (=2.5+8.2) percent for 
females. It is consistent with what we find in Table 4 that females have always higher 
education returns than males. 
For different age cohorts, education returns are very similar to the full sample 
except the cohort born after 1980. Because this cohort entered the labour force 
gradually after 2000, they experienced the higher education expansion and brought 
“newly” accumulated human capital into the labour force. For males, the education 
returns of the “One-child Policy” cohort have a dramatically jump from about 8.2 
percent in 2004 for an additional year of schooling to 16.2 (=8.2+8) percent in 2006 
and 15.1 (=8.2+6.9) percent in 2009. For females, the education returns are even 
higher which increase from about 10.3 percent for an additional year of schooling in 
2004 to 19.8 (=10.3+9.5) percent in 2006, and 19.1 (=10.3+8.8) percent in 2009. 
Hence, return rates for the youngest cohort are much higher than the older cohorts. It 
suggests that the human capital accumulated during the “pre-transition” period of 
economy may have an increasing returns in the “early-transition”, but would have less 
returns in the “late transition” than the “new” human capital accumulated during the 
“early-transition” period, supporting the findings of Flabbi et al. (2008) and Kang and 
Peng (2013).   
                                                             
7
 The table in Appendix shows the aggregated effects of each year (= the baseline 




(Table 5 is around here) 
 
Panel B shows the returns to schooling by cohort and gender using GIV. GIV 
estimation for returns to schooling is all higher than OLS results except females of 
older cohorts during the period of 2004-2009, which is consistent what we find in 
Table 4. It confirms that the biases of OLS are mainly downwards except upwards 
biases for females (especially in old cohorts) in recent years. And, we find that the 
“One-Child Policy” cohort still shows the highest education returns in GIV, and the 
most serious downwards biases of OLS. For example, the males born after 1980 have 
11.8 percent returns for an addition year of schooling in 2004, and then 24.3 
(=11.8+12.5) percent in 2006 and 26.4 (=11.8+14.6) percent in 2009. The biases 
between OLS and GIV estimation are about 3-11 percent for males.  
The females born after 1980 have 17.5 percent returns for an addition year of 
schooling in 2004, and then 33.3 (=17.5+15.8) percent in 2006 and 34.2 (=17.5+16.7) 
percent in 2009, which are higher than males and corresponding OLS results but still 
consistent with Card (1999) and Li and Luo (2004). The biases between OLS and GIV 
estimation are about 7-15 percent for females.  
Therefore, education returns of older cohorts have dropped in recent years for 
both genders, especially for females. The young cohort has much higher education 
returns than older cohorts maybe because of the accumulation of “new” human capital 
after the “reform and open-door” policy. As an increasing proportion of labour force, 
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the young females are helping stop the reversal of education returns gap between 
females and males. Upwards biases of OLS only happen in females of older cohorts 
after 2004. It suggests that only senior female workers with higher ability who also 
have more education, still competed with the younger cohorts with more higher 
education, even though their human capital accumulated from the education during 
the pre-transition has been substituted by “new” human capital accumulated by the 
younger cohort.      
 
V. Conclusions 
We examine the returns to schooling in China using the China 
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) dataset. In the baseline Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression, the returns to one more year of schooling increase from about 2 
percent in 1989 for both genders to 7 percent in 2009 for males, and 10.3 percent for 
females. The returns to schooling for females in all three cohorts are higher than 
males over the entire period, which is consistent with the literature using OLS for 
studies of Chinese education returns.  
However, we find more interesting results after overcoming the well-known 
endogeneity problem of education. We use the Generalized Instrumental Variable 
(GIV) regressions with three instruments: number of brothers, number of sisters and 
access to tap water which show strong associations with children’s education, 
especially for girls. As far as siblings are concerned, one more brother would decrease 
a boy’s schooling by about 0.16 year. One more sibling (brother or sister) would 
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decrease a girl’s schooling by about 0.17 year. As expected from the long tradition of 
son preference culture, boys’ education is much less affected by their sisters, as one 
more sister would decrease a boy’s schooling only by about 0.06 year. Access to tap 
water, as a proxy of public facilities, always has significantly positive effect on 
children’s education especially for girls. Education of females is more dependent on 
outside public goods than males.  
Comparing the OLS and GIV estimations for returns to schooling year by year, 
we find that there are downwards biases of OLS estimations for males in all years. 
However, for females, downwards biases of OLS estimation are only for data before 
2004. Comparing OLS and GIV estimations cohort by cohort can provide more 
detailed information. Regressions with year dummies are all higher than OLS results 
except older female during the period of 2004-2009. It confirms that the biases of 
OLS are mainly the downwards biases except upwards biases for females in recent 
years.  
Therefore, we find that the “One-Child-Policy” cohort shows the highest 
education returns in GIV and the most serious downwards biases from OLS. In this 
cohort, females have higher education returns than males’ and corresponding OLS 
results. These return rates for the youngest cohort are much higher than the older 
cohorts after 2004. It suggests that the human capital accumulated during the 
“pre-transition” period of economy may have an increasing returns in the 
“early-transition”, but would have less returns in the “late-transition” than the “new” 
human capital accumulated during the transition period, verifying the findings in 
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Flabbi et al. (2008) and Kang and Peng (2013). However, since the “One-Child Policy” 
cohort has much fewer observations than other cohorts in our sample, any formal 





Table 1: Data description by gender and year 
Male Employees All 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Real hourly wage rate (Yuan) 4.23 1.27 1.53 1.91 2.99 5.82 6.42 7.51 10.19 
Years of schooling (Years) 9.54 8.39 8.81 9.12 9.48 9.91 10.43 10.67 10.49 
Number of brothers 1.79 1.89 1.89 1.84 1.80 1.79 1.77 1.81 1.63 
Number of sisters 1.75 1.81 1.86 1.81 1.80 1.68 1.72 1.72 1.67 
Access to tap water  0.82 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.87 0.89 0.91 
Experience (Years) 22.26 20.39 21.97 21.36 21.54 20.88 23.82 24.63 25.19 
Urban  0.45 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.44 
Cohort (born before 1962)  0.51 0.62 0.66 0.59 0.49 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.32 
Cohort (born 1962-1980)  0.45 0.38 0.34 0.41 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.54 
Cohort (born after 1980)  0.04         0.05 0.07 0.09 0.14 
Female Employees All 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Real hourly wage rate (Yuan) 3.50 1.15 1.37 1.49 4.19 4.09 5.60 6.00 7.49 
Years of schooling (Years) 9.40 7.82 8.72 8.78 9.31 9.86 10.67 10.78 10.93 
Number of brothers 1.73 1.89 1.81 1.83 1.76 1.76 1.70 1.71 1.50 
Number of sisters 1.80 2.05 1.92 1.90 1.80 1.76 1.74 1.72 1.66 
Access to tap water  0.86 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.93 0.93 
Experience (Years) 18.42 18.13 17.70 18.00 17.47 17.50 19.08 20.18 20.33 
Urban  0.51 0.51 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.47 0.53 0.49 0.50 
Cohort (born before 1962)  0.38 0.54 0.53 0.48 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.21 0.11 
Cohort (born 1962-1980)  0.57 0.46 0.47 0.52 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.66 0.68 
Cohort (born after 1980)  0.05         0.07 0.12 0.13 0.21 
Data source: the CHNS dataset 1989-2009 
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Real hourly wage rate 
(Yuan) 3.77 4.62 6.80 
Years of schooling (Years) 8.96 10.12 10.59 
Number of brothers 2.07 1.58 0.43 
Number of sisters 1.89 1.65 0.81 
Access to tap water  0.83 0.81 0.82 
Experience (Years) 30.86 13.73 5.45 








Real hourly wage rate 
(Yuan) 3.17 3.53 5.92 
Years of schooling (Years) 8.35 9.98 11.18 
Number of brothers 2.01 1.58 0.82 
Number of sisters 2.06 1.67 0.64 
Access to tap water  0.89 0.84 0.79 
Experience (Years) 27.32 13.36 4.77 
Urban  0.58 0.47 0.43 

























Table 3: First step of GIV regressions 







Number of brothers -0.163*** -0.199*** -0.131*** -0.325 
 
0.026 0.036 0.032 0.278 
Number of sisters -0.060** 0.025 -0.175*** 0.054 
 
0.026 0.034 0.041 0.203 
Access to tap water 1.492*** 1.512*** 1.417*** 1.056*** 
 
0.108 0.147 0.113 0.292 
R-squared 0.321 0.389 0.157 0.443 
N 11415 5955 5020 440 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
F-test 78.46*** 44.81*** 62.67*** 5.19 







Number of brothers -0.167*** -0.066 -0.214*** -0.011 
 
0.043 0.062 0.058 0.262 
Number of sisters -0.174*** -0.123*** -0.202*** -0.379*   
 
0.031 0.047 0.041 0.214 
Access to tap water 1.742*** 1.867*** 1.641*** 1.534*** 
 
0.135 0.23 0.137 0.288 
R-squared 0.396 0.501 0.201 0.475 
N 7926 3176 4309 441 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
F-test 68.32*** 23.32*** 60.18*** 13.44*** 
Note: The italic standard errors are adjusted by clusters. The significant levels are * 
for 10%; ** for 5% and *** for 1%. Experience, experience square, urban dummy, 
provincial dummies and year dummies are not reported. Critical values complied by 
Stock and Yogo (2002) for the Cragg-Donald F statistic are around 10 for our 
estimations, which are passed easily except the male cohort born after 1980. 
 34 
 
Table 4: Education returns estimation using OLS and GIV regressions (by year and gender) 
  All 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Panel A. OLS regression by year, males 
Year of 
schooling 0.037*** 0.026*** 0.008 0.01 0.025*** 0.044*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.070*** 
 
0.003 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.01 0.009 0.008 0.008 
R-squared 0.596 0.135 0.101 0.065 0.08 0.072 0.184 0.206 0.127 
N 9961 1560 1577 1330 1210 1124 973 1045 1142 
OLS regression by year, females 
Year of 
schooling 0.054*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.018** 0.037*** 0.056*** 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.103*** 
 
0.004 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.01 
R-squared 0.593 0.093 0.089 0.107 0.087 0.081 0.268 0.244 0.286 
N 6708 1029 1106 909 832 718 677 686 751 
Panel B. Second step of GIV regression by year, males 
Schooling 0.070*** 0.056*** 0.011 0.047 0.032 0.045* 0.134*** 0.116*** 0.110*** 
 
0.008 0.02 0.024 0.031 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.018 0.021 
R-squared 0.591 0.115 0.1 0.064 0.069 0.046 0.118 0.139 0.082 
N 9607 1462 1510 1270 1150 1086 963 1030 1136 
Second step of GIV regression by year, females 
Schooling 0.062*** 0.057** 0.067*** 0.035 0.047* 0.075*** 0.096*** 0.055** 0.089*** 
 
0.009 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.027 0.023 0.024 
R-squared 0.581 0.09 0.081 0.105 0.069 0.056 0.145 0.085 0.166 
N 6569 997 1084 889 809 700 669 678 743 
Note: “Schooling” in the second step of GIV regression is the predicted value from the first step in Table 3. The italic standard error adjusted by 
clusters. The significant levels are * for 10%; ** for 5% and *** for 1%. Provincial dummy variables and year dummies are not reported. 
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Panel A. OLS regression by age cohort, males 
Schooling 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.028**  
 
0.004 0.004 0.013  
Schooling*year1991 -0.010* -0.010* -0.025  
 
0.006 0.006 0.017  
Schooling*year1993 -0.004 -0.005 -0.019  
 
0.007 0.008 0.018  
Schooling*year1997 0.01 0.011 -0.009  
 
0.009 0.01 0.017  
Schooling*year2000 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.005  
 
0.009 0.012 0.017  
Schooling*year2004 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.058*** 0.082** 
 
0.009 0.012 0.017 0.033 
Schooling*year2006 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.059*** 0.080*** 
 
0.008 0.011 0.017 0.028 
Schooling*year2009 0.061*** 0.073*** 0.043*** 0.069*** 
 
0.008 0.016 0.017 0.025 
R-squared 0.607 0.594 0.616 0.301 
N 9961 5383 4255 323 
OLS regression by age cohort, females 
Schooling 0.025*** 0.036*** 0  
 
0.006 0.007 0.01  
Schooling*year1991 0 -0.006 0.022  
 
0.008 0.009 0.014                 
Schooling*year1993 -0.009 -0.013 0.003                 
 
0.009 0.011 0.018                 
Schooling*year1997 0.006 -0.004 0.031*                 
 
0.011 0.015 0.016                 
Schooling*year2000 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.035**                 
 
0.011 0.014 0.015                 
Schooling*year2004 0.086*** 0.071*** 0.107*** 0.103**  
 
0.011 0.02 0.015 0.04 
Schooling*year2006 0.073*** 0.046*** 0.098*** 0.095*** 
 
0.01 0.014 0.016 0.023 
Schooling*year2009 0.082*** 0.031 0.114*** 0.088*** 
 
0.01 0.021 0.015 0.019 
R-squared 0.608 0.57 0.609 0.347 
N 6708 2742 3636 330 
Panel B. Second step of GIV regressions by age cohort, males 
Schooling 0.031*** 0.061*** 0.06  
 
0.011 0.016 0.039  
 36 
 
Schooling*year1991 -0.013 -0.014 -0.068 
 
 
0.011 0.011 0.052 
 Schooling*year1993 0.014 0.009 -0.021 
 
 
0.014 0.015 0.062 
 Schooling*year1997 0.003 -0.006 -0.074 
 
 
0.015 0.016 0.051 
 Schooling*year2000 0.039*** 0.041** -0.032 
 
0.014 0.017 0.051  
Schooling*year2004 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.103** 0.118* 
 
0.015 0.021 0.048 0.064 
Schooling*year2006 0.098*** 0.088*** 0.130*** 0.125*** 
 
0.013 0.018 0.049 0.048 
Schooling*year2009 0.079*** 0.074*** 0.046 0.146*** 
 
0.015 0.022 0.049 0.055 
R-squared 0.596 0.582 0.608 0.278 
N 9607 5212 4082 313 
Second step of GIV regressions by age cohort, females 
Schooling 0.048*** 0.068*** 0.077***  
 
0.015 0.021 0.026  
Schooling*year1991 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017  
 
0.015 0.017 0.04  
Schooling*year1993 -0.023 -0.021 -0.076*  
 
0.016 0.017 0.041  
Schooling*year1997 -0.022 -0.025 -0.067*  
 
0.018 0.02 0.039  
Schooling*year2000 0.024 0.034 -0.026  
 
0.017 0.021 0.035 
 Schooling*year2004 0.052*** 0.034 0.068** 0.175*** 
 
0.018 0.026 0.034 0.05 
Schooling*year2006 0.031* 0.003 0.049 0.158*** 
 
0.018 0.024 0.037 0.044 
Schooling*year2009 0.075*** 0.053* 0.070* 0.167*** 
 
0.019 0.028 0.037 0.043 
R-squared 0.586 0.567 0.584 0.339 
N 6569 2704 3545 320 
Note: “Schooling” is the predicted value from the first step in Table 3. The standard 
error adjusted by clusters. The italic standard error adjusted by clusters. The 
significant levels are * for 10%; ** for 5% and *** for 1%. Experience, experience 
square, urban dummy, provincial dummies variables are not reported. The significant 
levels are * for 10%; ** for 5% and *** for 1%. Provincial dummy variables and 















Panel A. OLS regression by age cohort, males 
1989 0.015 0.021 
  1991 0.005 0.011 0 
 1993 0.015 0.021 0 
 1997 0.015 0.021 0 
 2000 0.047 0.062 0.032 
 2004 0.082 0.089 0.085 0.082 
2006 0.089 0.098 0.087 0.162 
2009 0.076 0.094 0.071 0.151 
OLS regression by age cohort, females 
1989 0.025 0.036 
  1991 0.025 0.036 0.022 
 1993 0.025 0.036 0.022                 
1997 0.025 0.036 0.053                 
2000 0.06 0.085 0.057                 
2004 0.111 0.107 0.129 0.103 
2006 0.098 0.082 0.121 0.198 
2009 0.107 0.036 0.136 0.191 
Panel B. Second step of GIV regressions by age cohort, males 
1989 0.031 0.061 
  
1991 0.031 0.061 0 
 
1993 0.031 0.061 0 
 
1997 0.031 0.061 0 
 
2000 0.07 0.102 0 
 
2004 0.103 0.134 0.161 0.118 
2006 0.129 0.149 0.188 0.243 
2009 0.11 0.135 0.103 0.264 
Second step of GIV regressions by age cohort, females 
1989 0.048 0.068 
  
1991 0.048 0.068 0 
 
1993 0.048 0.068 0                 
1997 0.048 0.068 0                 
2000 0.048 0.068 0                 
2004 0.1 0.068 0.135 0.175 
2006 0.079 0.068 0.116 0.333 
2009 0.123 0.121 0.137 0.342 
Notes: figures are the sum of the baseline returns and incremental effects of year 
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